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SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
BY MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early part of the last century, the judiciary recognized the
shareholder derivative action as a means for shareholders to redress a breach
of fiduciary duty by an officer or director.! Soon thereafter, courts ruled that
the successful plaintiff was entitled to recover attorneys' fees from the
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Victoria Johnson, Class of 1998, for her valuable research assistance, and his colleagues, Cliff
Calhoun, Wayne Gazur, Dennis Hynes, and Dale Oesterle, who commented on an earlier version
of this essay.
'For early cases recognizing the shareholder derivative action, see Attorney Gen. v. Utica
Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 381-90 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (commenting in dicta that an action could lie
for director accountability and that persons exercising corporate powers may be accountable to the
court for a breach of the duty of care); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. 68,75-78 (La. 1829) (holding
that in an action by shareholders of a banking corporation against three principal directors for
fraudulent and unfaithful conduct, the directors are only responsible for errors "of so gross a kind,
that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it"); Taylor v.
Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162, 165-68 (Ohio 1831) (holding that "a 'stockholder in an
incorporated [b]ank, may sustain [an action] against the corporation, the directors [and] other
stockholders [for fraudulent practices], depreciating the value of the stock, suspending banking
operations, and withholding dividends") (citing Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co. for the
proposition that corporate directors may be held accountable where there is a fraudulent breach of
trust); and Robinsonv. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222,233 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (determining that "[g]enerally,
where there has been a waste or misapplication of the corporate fimds by... officers or agents...
a suit to compel them to account for such waste or misapplication should be in the name of the
corporation"). These first American cases postdated, by a few years, the earliest English cases. See
Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (1742) (finding the directors of a
charitable corporation to have failed to monitor the loan procedures of the corporation in making
unsecured loans to fellow directors and therefore, holding the directors liable for the resulting loan
losses on the theory of gross negligence); Adley v. Whitstable Co., 34 Eng. Rep. 122 (Ch. 1810);
Hichens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. R ep. 917 (Ch. 1828). The action was further defined in Foss v.
Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (Ch. 1843), andDodgev. Woolsey, 59U.S. 331 (1 How.) (1855).
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corporation on whose behalf the shareholder brought the suit.2 Early cases
seemed to require the creation of a "common fund," that is, a pool of money
from which these fees would be paid.3 In recent years, however, the courts
have abandoned this requirement. Instead, in the absence of a common
fund, the courts have been willing to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiff if
the derivative litigation resulted in a "substantial or common benefit" to the
corporation, whether by judgment or settlement.5 The courts have been quite
2See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) (collecting cases from both English and
American courts permitting the award of attorneys' fees in litigation). The rationale for creating an
exception to the normal American rule that parties to litigation bear their own attorneys' fees was
that in successful derivative litigation a whole class of people- the shareholders of the corporation
-benefits from the successful litigation and, on general equity principles, should be called upon to
bear a portion of the expense. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970)
(recognizing that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees in derivative litigation because allowing
"others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiffs efforts without contributing equally to the litigation
expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiffs expense"). In addition, requiring
the plaintiff-shareholder to pay his attorney would deter almost all such suits because the benefit to
any individual shareholder is likely to be small, while the cost in fees is likely to be relatively large.
See George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. Rv.
784, 791 (1939) [hereinafter Hornstein, Counsel Fee] ("If reimbursement were not permitted to a
stockholder successfully prosecuting a suit to redress a wrong to his corporation, the practical effect
would be the same as if the suits were prohibited...."). Thus, to encourage meritorious derivative
actions, courts order the corporation to reimburse plaintiffforhis costs and expenses in bringing the
action, including his attorneys' fees. See George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage"
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658, 663 (1956) ("Every successful suit duly
rewarded encourages other suits to redress misconduct and by the same token discourages
misconduct which would occasion suit.").
The authority ofthe federal courts to award attorneys' fees in the absence of an applicable
statute rests in their inherent equity authority. Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Socy, 421
U.S. 240, 259 (1975).
'The origin of this doctrine can be found in two United States Supreme Court cases:
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), and Central RR. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S.
116(1885). The necessity of a common fund can be traced back to Coleman v. United States, 152
U.S. 96 (1894). See generally John P. Dawson, Lawyers and involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees
firom Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597, 1603-12 (1974) (discussing the origins of the common fund
doctrine).
4California first recognized that a successful plaintiff could recover attorneys' fees in the
absence of a common fund in 1968. Fletcher v. AJ. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App.
1968). See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
5Few courts have defined the term "substantial benefit." One definition, in an oft-cited case,
reflects the ambiguity of the term: "[A substantial benefit is] one that accomplishes a result which
corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the
corporation or affect the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stockholder's interest."
Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light& Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 425-27 (Minn. 1960). The United
States Supreme Court cited this language with approval in Mills, 396 U.S. at395-96 (discussed infra
atnotes23-40). InRosenbaumv. MacAllister, 64F.3d 1439,1444(10th Cir. 1995), the court used
the term "common benefit"to describe what appears to be a "substantial benefit." The courtrefused
to characterize the fund recovered as a "common fund" for purposes of calculating an attorneys' fee
based on the fund. Id. at 1447. See infra text accompanying notes 6-7.
Justice Christian, dissenting in Fletcher, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 157, a case in which the California
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willing, too willing perhaps, to find a substantial benefit when the derivative
action settles, the plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees, and the defendant does not
object.6 In contrast to the judicial deference relative to settlement
agreements, courts typically scrutinize fee requests that follow judgments.
This evolution from common fund to substantial benefit, combined
with judicial reluctance to scrutinize derivative action settlements, has meant
that the value of the "benefit" obtained by "successful" plaintiffs has often
been insubstantial, especially when viewed in light of the fees sought by
Appellate Court first recognized the substantial benefit doctrine, expressed his concern that "[t]he
variety of shareholders' actions in which 'substantial benefit' to the corporation may be found is
literally boundless." His gloomy prediction was borne out in United Operating Co. v. Karnes, 482
F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court conceded that "the major benefit to the
company is the termination of this expensive and time-consuming litigation." Not all courts have
embraced the substantial benefit doctrine. Rhode Island, for example, continues to deny plaintiffs
an award of attorneys' fees in derivative actions because of the absence of statutory authority to do
so. Kaufman Malchman & Kirby, P.C. v. Hasbro, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 719, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating that "Rhode Island common law incorporates the American rule regarding attorneys' fees
[which results in] parties bearing their own costs in the absence of specific statutory or contractual
provisions to the contrary"); Eleazar v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990)
(reversing award of attomeys' fees in the absence of statutory authority or contractual liability and
restraining judicial construction of implied authority where the statutes are unequivocal and
unambiguous). See also Industrial Distribution Group, Inc. v. Waite, 485 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ga.
1997), in which the Georgia Supreme Court reserved judgment on whether it would adopt the
substantial benefit rule.
'Me courts have also awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiff in the absence of a favorable
judgment or settlement as long as the corporation "cures" the wrong complained of, and seeks
dismissal of the action, provided the plaintiffs actions were the cause of the cure. Mintz v. Bohen,
210 A.2d 569,570 (Del. Ch. 1965). But see Kaufman Malchman & Kirby, 897 F. Supp. at 724
(holding that under New York law, where plaintiffs only action was making a demand on the
corporation that resulted in a cure of the wrong complained ot plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys'
fees).
The courts have applied the substantial benefit rule to cases in which the plaintiff sues in
a representative capacity, such as Mills, and where the plaintiff sues individually but confers a
substantial benefit on an ascertainable class. Hallv. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,15(1973) (stating that union
member, in suit vindicating his own right offree speech, conferred a substantial benefit on the union
and its members, thereby entitling him to an award of attorneys' fees from the union treasury); Reiser
v. Del Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that an individual
plaintiff is not precluded from claiming attorneys' fees even though defendant's actions caused the
claim to be moot).
7Compare In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 9-21, with Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1997
Del. Ch. LEXIS 18 (Del. Co. Feb. 6, 1997), reprinted in 22 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1300 (1997) where
ChancellorAllen, authorofthe Caremarkdecision, rejected plaintiffs fee application in the amount
of $1,529,867 based on a normal hourly billing rate and, instead, awarded plaintiffs a fee equal to
one-third of the common fund of $430,092 generated in the case or $143,364. In reaching this
conclusion, Chancellor Allen ruled that the intangible benefits secured in the litigation were
insubstantial and speculative. Ia at*16. See also In re Dunkin' Donuts Shareholders Litig., [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,725 (Del. Co. Nov. 27,1990), reprinted in 16 DEL.
J. CoRP. L. 1443 (1991) (reducing the fee request in a derivative action, that resulted in more
favorable sale of the corporation, from $2,500,000 to $922,000).
1999]
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plaintiffs counsel. This development has been particularly important in
cases alleging a breach of the duty of due care by the directors, because the
essence of the plaintiffs complaint is that the defendants' dereliction caused
a monetary loss to the corporation. If the plaintiff fails to obtain a monetary
recovery, presumably it has failed in the action. A perusal of the settlements
in such actions, however, makes clear that increasingly, the derivative action
has been used less to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty and more to alter or
affect corporate governance or provide some other kind of intangible relief.'
Cases such as In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation9 typify this trend. Caremark, a derivative action claiming the
directors breached their duty of care, was filed soon after the corporation
settled federal civil and criminal claims alleging improper payments under
federal Medicare and Medicaid rules." These settlements, together with
related private civil claims, cost the corporation approximately $250
million.' The shareholder action alleged that the directors failed to
adequately "supervise the conduct of Caremark employees.""2  The
'E.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring Bell Atlantic to
institute internal mechanisms to improve sales and marketing mechanisms, immunizing corporate
directors for past conduct, and mandating changes in corporate governance); Granada lnvs. Inc. v.
DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1205 (6th Cir. 1992) (instituting changes in corporate governance
requiring addition of three independent directors to the board, creating a special committee to
oversee compensation and intercorporate transactions, andrequiring annual shareholdermeetings);
Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386,391 (4th Cir. 1986) (adopting new procedures to be followed in
future tender offers or takeover bids, altering procedures for regrant and termination of stock
options, but no monetary relief); In re General Tire & Rubber Co. See. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1079
(6th Cir. 1984) (implementing remedial action and addition oftwo independent outside directors for
three years to prevent future improprieties); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 454 (5th Cir.
1983) (removing chairman for breach of fiduciary duty, increasing management emphasis on
maximizing currentbusiness components, implementing stricterpolicies on use of company assets,
and developing new internal control procedures); Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,716 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1982) (mandating revised
corporate policies for shareholder disclosure of commission payments); United Operating Co. v.
Karnes, 482 F. Supp. 1029,1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (resulting in new auditing procedures to control
future illegal discounts and conclude the litigation, which were deemed the most significant benefit
to the corporation); In re Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Cos. Shareholders Litig., No. 13,109, 1996 WL
74214, at * I (Del. Ch. Feb. 27,1996) (informing shareholders of the valuation ranges calculated by
the company in determining fair share price for impending takeover as sale benefit to corporation
supporting $690,000 in attorneys' fees); In re Caremark Intl, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
966 (Del. Ch. 1996) (eliminating monetary component and basing settlement on a requirement that
management adopt and implement significant compliance-related programs); Good v. Texaco, Inc.,
No. 7501, 1985 WL 11536, at * 17-18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985), reprinted in 10 DEL. J. CORP. L.
854 (1985) (stipulating that modification of the repurchase agreement and disclosure to the
shareholders of plaintiffs' investigation results supports award of $700,000 in attorneys' fees).
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
101d. at 960-61.
"Id. at 961.
Id. at 964.
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
shareholders' claim, however, suffered from at least two noticeable flaws:
first, the board had put in place structures designed to avoid the problems
that occurred; thus, there was a strong defense on the merits. 3 Second, and
of greater importance, the corporation's articles of incorporation eliminated
the liability of directors for monetary damages for mere breaches of the duty
of care, which constituted the gravamen of the plaintiffs' allegations.1 4
Therefore, plaintiffs' claim against the directors seemed doomed from the
start.
Despite the weakness of their claims, the plaintiffs were able to garner
a settlement that consisted of modest reforms in corporate governance 5 and
immodest attorneys' fees of $816,000 (plus $53,000 in expenses). 16 In
approving the settlement, the Delaware Court of Chancery observed that
"there is a very low probability that it would be determined that the directors
of Caremark breached any duty to appropriately monitor and supervise the
enterprise." 7 Insofar as the court approved the settlement, the case is
unremarkable; courts routinely approve settlements even if the plaintiffs
case is demonstrably weak." It is somewhat noteworthy, however, that in
approving the settlement of the case, the court approved a generous
allowance for attorneys' fees despite finding "only a modest substantive
benefit"'9 for the corporation, a rare admission that the attorney fee award
may be supported by a minimal, as opposed to a substantial, "recovery."
It may be that the Chancellor was imprecise in his use of language in
determining that the "modest substantive benefit" in Caremark was indeed
a "substantial benefit" to the corporation. Nevertheless, one might question
whether the approval of attorneys' fees for producing that sort of benefit -
a reform in corporate governance - is justified in any amount; and if so,
whether the amount should not be grounded primarily on the value of the
benefit realized. Quite often, and Caremark is an example of this, plaintiff
3Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. Among the steps that Caremark took was the publication
of a detailed compliance guide for its employees; the implementation of policy requiring various
officers to approve each contractual relationship entered into by Caremark with a physician; the
maintenance of an internal audit plan designed to assure compliance with business and ethics
policies; the adoption of an internal audit charter requiring a comprehensive review of compliance
policies; and the compilation of an employee ethics handbook concerning such policies, etc. Id at
963.
"
4Id. at 965.
"Id. at 966. Caremark agreed that the full board would discuss relevant changes in
government health care regulations and that the board would establish a compliance and ethics
committee of four directors. This committee would meet at least four times per year, monitor the
company's compliance with applicable federal law and report to the board.
161d. at 972.
'
7Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
"
8See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
9Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972.
1999]
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files a case seeking monetary recovery for a monetary loss suffered by the
corporation but enters into a settlement devoid of monetary relief for the
corporation. In these cases, plaintiff does not set out to reform the
governance of the corporation but settles for it because plaintiff knows that
such a settlement will support an award of attorneys' fees. This reality has
the apparent (although not intended) effect of encouraging the use of
derivative actions to reform corporate governance. From the perspective of
plaintiffs counsel, this may be a rather circuitous route to corporate
governance reform, but it does support a fee, and that is often the motivating
force behind the filing of the action. The judiciary's approval of these
settlements has made all of this possible."
The result in Caremark, and the many other cases that it typifies,2'
may reflect judicial reluctance to reverse an arrangement that disposes of a
case to the parties' satisfaction. This judicial timidity, however, comes at a
cost: the filing of a marginal and possibly frivolous case is encouraged; the
party that was supposed to benefit from a successful derivative action -the
corporation - often ends up paying the plaintiffs legal fees and receives
little if any benefit from the action; and corporate resources are wasted
litigating the action. Most importantly, an abuse of the judicial process
occurs because an action designed to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty is
used for a different purpose.
In this essay I suggest that the courts reconsider the current policy of
approving attorneys' fees in a derivative action settlement unless the
settlement (1) generates a common fund out of which such fees may be paid,
(2) produces an intangible benefit reasonably susceptible of valuation, or (3)
reflects a strong nexus between the relief sought in the complaint and the
relief obtained. An analysis of the modem origin of the substantial benefit
"See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
Cin. L. REv. 1, 48 (1991) ("Judges rarely reject fee petitions as part of a settlement" on the merits.
Ifthe fee settlement is rejectedjudges may find themselves wading through a myriad ofdocuments
doing fee calculations orrisk losing the settlement.). Butsee Schechtmanv. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537,
538 (2d Cir. 1957) (denying counsel fees of $25,000 aflter finding no benefit to a corporation from
a derivative action where the plaintiff could have sought recovery gratuitously from the Federal
Trade Commission); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1457-58 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(utilizing a competitive bidding approach to class counsel selection thereby capping fees and
denying requests for expense overages and interest); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Tolson, 27 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 87, 91-94 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (disapproving settlement and counsel fee award, considering
Rule 11 sanctions, and determining that proposed settlement measures were temporary and
inadequate and resulted in loss to company); Seinfeld v. Robinson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 707,714 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997), discussed infra notes 40-52 (stating that requiring the court to determine a
reasonable fee when an unreasonable one has been requested would only serve to encourage
unreasonable demands leading to a fee reduction down to reasonable limits as the only
consequence).
21See cases cited supra note 5.
[V/ol. 24
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doctrine, a review of its application in recent cases and the perverse effects
of its use all point to the need for reconsideration. While the origins of this
trend can be traced back to at least 1949, 2 the 1970 United States Supreme
Court decision in Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co.'a gave it a significant boost.
II. MILLS V. ELECTRIC A UTO-LTE Co.: NOT THE RIGHT PRECEDENT
Mills was a combined derivative and class action suit. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants obtained proxies for the approval of a corporate
merger by means of false and misleading statements in violation of
Securities and Exchange Commission rules and, therefore, in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.24 Although the suit was filed just prior to
the shareholder vote on the merger, the case did not come to trial until after
the merger was consummated.' The principal issue in the case related to
causation - could the plaintiffs demonstrate a causal relationship between
the alleged violation and the injury for which they sought redress.26
But more germane to present purposes, the Court went on to consider
plaintiffs petition for attorneys' fees for services accrued to that point in the
case and held that plaintiffs should be entitled to an award of fees.27 In so
holding, the Court considered, and rejected, the need for a "common fund"
from which fees could be awarded.2" Instead, the Court held that it would
be sufficient if the plaintiffs actions resulted in a substantial benefit to the
corporation.29 That occurred in this case, the Court concluded, because the
plaintiffs were successful "in vindicating the statutory policy" of fair and
informed corporate suffrage and that vindication was a "substantial service"
to the corporation and its shareholders."
'See Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 209 A.2d 459 (Del. Ch. 1949), decided by
Chancellor Seitz in 1949 but not published until 1965. The court there held that a benefit to the
corporation could support an award of attomeys' fees in a derivative action, even in the absence of
a common fund. In Rosenthal, the plaintiffs alleged that filing the suit caused the defendant to cure
the alleged wrong, thereby rendering the case moot. If the action was meritorious, the court held,
a fee would be warranted. Id. at 461.
-396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills is often cited as expanding the common fund doctrine to
allowplaintiffs attorneys' fees ifplaintiffsecures asubstantial, albeit intangible, benefit forthe class
of corporation. E.g., Reiser v. Del Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1979).
1 Mills, 396 U.S. at 377-78.2 Id
11d. at 377. The Supreme Court concluded that if the proxy solicitation was an "essential
link" in the accomplishment of the transaction, plaintiff could satisfy the causation requirement by
a showing that there was a "material" violation of the rule in question. Id. at 385.271d at 396-97.
-Mills, 396 U.S. at 392-97.
29I at 396-97.
3 1d. at 396.
1999]
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The Court cited a 1940 district court case that employed the term
"corporate therapeutics" to characterize the benefit to the shareholders." The
Court apparently meant that if the shareholder's action remedies corporate
wrongdoing, an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate, even if that remedy
did not generate money for the corporation. The attorneys' fee award in
Mills thus turned on two factors: first, the importance attached by the Court
to the plaintiffs success on the merits of the case; and second, the policy of
encouraging shareholders to act as private attorneys general in enforcing the
federal proxy rules.32 In light of the latter, the fact that the plaintiff was
successful in achieving ajudicial determination that the defendants violated
the proxy rules was of substantial benefit to the corporation.
State courts deciding whether to approve settlements in derivative
actions that include plaintiffs attorneys' fees have cited Mills as support for
the proposition that plaintiff can recover fees if the suit results in a
substantial benefit to the corporation.33 This often signals a generous
application of Mills, however, because in the garden variety settlement of a
derivative action there is, at best, a tenuous nexus between the wrong
complained of and the relief obtained. Using the recent Caremark case as an
example, the shareholders there complained of a breach of the duty of care
by the directors that resulted in substantial monetary loss to the corporation.?'
There was no finding in Caremark, as there was in Mills, that there was a
violation of law, nor was there a payment of money to redress the wrong
identified by the shareholders. Of equal importance, no policy under state
law encouraged shareholders to act as private attorneys general to assure that
directors discharged their fiduciary duties, as opposed to the federal policy
that encourages shareholders to enforce the federal proxy rules.3" Just five
"Id at 396 n.23 (citing Murphy v. North Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1940)).
"2Mills, 396 U.S. at 396 n.23.
"E.g., James v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 713 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1997) (awarding
over $3.5 million to plaintiffs' attorneys in challenge to administration ofAlabama public schools);
Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248, 266-67 (Alaska 1996) (remanding for
determination of attorneys' fees in light of Mills, holding that no common find need be created when
class members derive substantial benefit); and Gigot v. Cities Serv. Oil, 737 P.2d 18 (Kan. 1987)
(affirming award of attorneys' fees in class action to recover the value of helium extracted from
natural gas).
341n re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 1996).
"Mills was decided after J.I. Case Co. v. Borak 377 U.S. 426,430-31 (1964), where the
Supreme Court held that a private right of action existed to enforce section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In Borak the Court reasoned that the recognition ofa private right of action
was appropriate because the Securities and Exchange Commission could not review all ofthe proxy
statements filed with it and "the possibility of [private] civil damages or injunctive relief serves as
a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements." Id at 432. It is somewhat
ironic that if Borak were decided today, the Court would not recognize a private right of action to
[Vol. 24
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years after it decided Mills, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
federal courts had jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees under a private
attorney general theory.36
State law contains a host of procedural obstacles to shareholder
derivative actions against directors,37 and one potentially devastating
substantive obstacle, when the claim rests on breach of the duty of care. The
substantive obstacle to plaintiffs success in due care cases is, of course, the
statutory provisions enacted in the last ten years allowing a corporation to
include in its articles of incorporation a provision limiting director liability.
Following the 1985 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
Gorkom,3 which held directors liable for breaching the duty of care,
Delaware, and then virtually all other states, amended their corporate codes
to allow corporations to eliminate director liability for monetary damages for
breaches of the duty of care.39 Thus, a duty of care case can succeed in the
face of such a provision only if the plaintiffcan prove that the directors acted
in bad faith or engaged in intentional misconduct or in a knowing violation
of law.
Clearly, then, Mills is weak precedent for approving of plaintiffs fee
request in shareholder derivative actions when the underlying claim is breach
of the duty of care. When a director is alleged to have violated that duty, and
the corporation's articles of incorporation contain a state-permitted provision
limiting director liability, the state's policy appears to discourage such
enforce section 14(a). In subsequent cases in which parties have sought to persuade the Court to
recognize an implied private right of action, the Court has been most reluctant to do so. See, e.g.,
Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank, NA., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977),
demonstrating a different approach to the implication of a private right of action under a federal
statute. In short, the Court is loathe to imply a right that Congress failed to express by sanction,
leadingmanyto conclude that analytically, at least, Borakhas been overruled. JAMES D. CoxErAL.,
SEcuRrEs REGULATION 650 (1997).
'Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
"Among other things, many state statutes require the shareholder-plaintiffto post security
for expenses and risk liability for attorneys' fees if the action fails. Most states require that the
plaintiffmake a demand on the board of directors before bringing the suit, and generally the board
has broad discretion in dealing with plaintiffs demand. A board decision to dismiss the action is
difficult for the plaintiffto overcome. By contrast, a class action alleging that the board ofdirectors
violated section 14(a) of the 1934 Act is subject to no such limitations.
11488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
39See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1994); MODEL BUs. CORP. AcT
§ 2.02(b)(4). Delaware provides an exception that precludes eliminating or limiting director
personal liability for acts or omissions not in "good faith," for those involving intentional misconduct
orknowing violation ofthe law, or those from which the director personally benefitted. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1994).
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actions. Moreover, the relief typically provided in the settlement (corporate
governance reform) is obtainable by other, more direct means. Finally, even
if the corporation has not amended its articles to take advantage of the
liability limitation, the mere presence of such a provision in the statute
undercuts the notion of a state policy favoring the cause of action. An
obscure case from the New York Supreme Court, Seinfeld v. Robinson,0
stands in stark contrast to the line of cases typified by Caremark.
III. THE JUDICIARY TAKES A STAND: SEINFELD v ROBINSON
Seinfeld arose from two unrelated alleged breaches of the fiduciary
duty of care by directors of American Express Company (Amex). The first
of these allegations related to an incident in which a former Amex officer
settled a defamation claim against Amex, resulting in the payment of $8
million by Amex to various charities designated by this former officer.41 The
details of the incident are somewhat murky in the judicial report of the case.
Apparently, an Amex employee had retained an investigator whose methods
of operation were at least partly responsible for the statements that gave rise
to the defamation action4 The plaintiffs in the derivative action alleged that
Amex should have had adequate systems of internal control to protect
against the conduct that gave rise to the defamation action and should have
pursued claims against Amex employees who bore some responsibility for
the incident.43 After a careful review, an independent committee of Amex
directors determined that pursuing such an action was not in the best
interests of the corporation."
The second alleged breach was rather conventional -that the Amex
directors failed to monitor adequately the company's substantial investment
in Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc., an investment that resulted in substantial
financial losses to Amex.45 The opinion gives no details on this claim,
except to say that it was released in the settlement.
These two claims were disposed of in a settlement that required Amex
to adopt two corporate resolutions, each of which was to be effective for a
period of only four years." The first was designed to avoid a repeat of the
incident that gave rise to the defamation by requiring the involvement of the
corporate general counsel and the audit committee whenever senior
-656 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
41id. at 708.
42 d.
431d. at 709.
-Seinfeld, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 709.4S1d.
-Id. at 709, 711.
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management seeks to retain investigators of special projects.47 The second
resolution required independent outside directors to exercise business
judgment in any major acquisitions of investment banking companies.O On
their face, these corporate actions seemed to be of limited value. The first
was narrowly tailored to avoid a situation highly unlikely to recur, and the
second imposed on directors little beyond what the law already required.
The New York Supreme Court expressed its skepticism of the value of the
changes in corporate governance, and denied the request of plaintiffs'
attorneys for $3.5 million in fees and expenses.
The court analyzed the corporate governance changes from two
perspectives: first the value of these changes to the company going forward;
and second, the relationship between these changes and the relief originally
sought in the complaint. The court found the resolutions deficient in both
respects. As to the value of the corporate governance changes, the court
observed that the "[a]doption of 'cosmetic! and 'ephemeral' guidelines do not
constitute a tangible nonmonetary benefit for which [the] stockholders'
attorneys merit compensation by the company.""0 As to the relationship
between the relief obtained and the relief sought the court simply said that
the "[s]ettlement does not achieve the relief sought in the complaint."'" In
this regard, the court compared other decisions, observing that "fee awards
are warranted where the result directly impacts upon the complained of
conduct." 2 As an abstract proposition, this seems intuitively correct, and the
court cited several cases to support its conclusion. In practice, however,
distinguishing between a settlement that has a direct nexus to the alleged
breach and one that does not is often difficult. Moreover, even if the nexus
is present it does not necessarily follow that the court should approve the
settlement including generous attorneys' fees. The next section discusses
this problem: is there a readily available means to identify settlements with
an adequate nexus, and should the presence of such a nexus justify an award
of attorneys' fees?
471d. at 710.
"Seinfeld, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
49I1d at 714 & nA.
'Id at 712 (citing Moklber v. Cohn, 608 F. Supp. 616,628 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 783
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1986)).
"Id at 711. Presumably, the court reached the same conclusion on the second claim, which
related to investment banking investment, but the court did not make a separate finding on the claim.
S2Seinfield, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 712 (citing Elite of N.Y. Cars, Ltd. v. Zarbhanelian, 626
N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. 1995); Mencher v. Sachs, 164 A.2d 320 (Del. 1960); Kopet v. Esquire Realty
Co., 523 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1975); Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974)).
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IV. THE PRESENCE OF A NExuS BETWEEN THE COMPLAINT
AND SETITLEMENT
The most compelling case for approving attorneys' fees in the absence
of a common fund is where the relief obtained bears a strong nexus to the
perceived wrong. For instance, if the complaint alleges that the directors
failed to adequately consider a merger proposal before submitting it to the
shareholders for a vote, and the parties settle the action with the defendant-
directors agreeing to reconsider the matter and resubmit it to the
shareholders, then the award of attorneys' fees is an easy case based on the
strong nexus between the complaint and the relief.53 Indeed, the settlement
vindicates the filing of the action. Conversely, if the parties settle the action
with the corporation agreeing to create a new committee to review
fundamental corporate changes before a board vote, an award of attorneys'
fees seems far less justified, as the nexus between the complaint and the
relief obtained is weak at best.54 The salient difference between these
hypothetical settlements is whether the relief obtained corrects the alleged
wrong (the first example) or merely provides some prophylactic protection
against its recurrence (the second example). The latter ought to be carefully
scrutinized by the courts.
For instance, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger,"s plaintiff filed a
derivative action on the heels of a settlement between a Bell Atlantic
subsidiary, Bell of Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Attorney General in
which the Attorney General alleged that Bell of Pennsylvania violated state
"See, e.g., ONeill v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 910 F.2d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the district court's decision thatplaintiff-shareholderwas entitled to attorneys' fees where
her prosecution of the action affected the decision ofthe directors to approve a revised tender offer,
that increased the corporation's stock value and thereby "conferred a substantial benefit" on the
corporation); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (concluding that
defendants' cancellation of objectionable stock option plan when shareholder's suit was on the "brink
ofsuccess" formed the basis for an inference that cancellation was caused by the shareholder's suit,
but reservingjudgment on whether the suit "caused or substantially contributed" to cancellation of
the plan); Joy Mfg. Corp. v. Pullman-Peabody Co., 729 F. Supp. 449, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1989)
(approving attorneys' fees and finding a benefit to the corporation where derivative action challenged
validity ofantitakeovermeasures thatthwarted hostile takeover, causing the corporation to put itself
up for auction); Cohan v. Loucks, No. 12,323, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 99 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1993),
reprinted in 19 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 697 (1994) (involving a derivative action that complained of
corporate adherence to Arab boycott, where relief included corporate undertaking to reinvest in
Israel, and attorneys' fees of $700,000 awarded).
'For a contrary view, arguing that the substantial benefit rule creates too much of an
obstacle to the recovery of attorneys' fees, see Carol G. Hammett, Note, Attorneys' Fees in
Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CAL. L. REV. 164,
165, 167, 185-88 (1972).
52 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993).
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unfair practices and consumer protection laws. 6 As a result of the
settlement, Bell Atlantic agreed to pay over $40 million in refunds to
customers, make contributions to a consumer education trust and reimburse
the Attorney General for its legal costs' The derivative action alleged, inter
alia, that the Bell Atlantic directors breached their duty of care in allowing
this improper activity to occur. 8 The action was settled with an agreement
by Bell Atlantic to: (1) disclose to its shareholders the information regarding
the Bell Atlantic settlement and related litigation, (2) establish new
procedures to monitor sales and marketing programs, and (3) pay plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and expenses up to $450,000."9 Three shareholder-objectors
questioned whether the new monitoring procedures justified the award of
attorneys' fees and appealed the district court's approval of the settlement to
the Third Circuit.'
While the shareholder-objectors were unsuccessful in their appeal,6 '
their arguments were not without merit. The settlement of the derivative
action simply created a mechanism to assure that Bell Atlantic and its
subsidiaries would comply with the law.62 This does nothing, of course, to
remedy the wrong complained of; the remedy looks only to the future.
Plaintiff, of course, could respond that avoiding similar future losses is of
value. But is this outcome of sufficient value to justify protracted and
expensive litigation, not to mention the shifting of attorneys' fees to the
corporation? Put differently, if plaintiff had sought this relief in its
complaint, to the exclusion of all other relief, including monetary damages,
is it not likely that defendants would have settled immediately? Assuming
the answer is "yes," then perhaps the corporate defendant should only have
to pay for the value of the benefit, largely ignoring the litigation costs of the
plaintiff.63
One might respond that, in litigation, the defendant frequently ends
up settling a claim for an amount that it would have immediately agreed to
pay if proposed. That is the nature of any dispute resolution mechanism.
Moreover, the assurance that the settlement will be upheld (or immune from
6Id. at 1306 &n.2.
"Id. at 1306.
uId.
'
9BellAtlantic, 2 F.3d at 1306-07.
6Id. at 1307.
"'Idk at 1318.
621d at 1306-07.
"See Lewis v. Great W. United Corp., No. 5397, 1978 Del. Ch. LEXIS 723, at * 11-12
(Del. Ch. Mar. 28,1978), reprinted in 4 DEL.J. CoRp. L. 248,256 (1979) (recognizing that where
a fund is created or preserved, the Delaware courts have said that time and hourly rates are not the
most significant elements in ajudicial determination of attorneys' fees).
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subsequent re-opening) is precisely what encourages parties to negotiate and
settle. 4  Derivative litigation is, however, distinctive. In derivative
litigation, plaintiffs attorney traditionally has had a strong incentive to
prolong the litigation, since the fee that he or she might obtain is often linked
to the hours expended and only loosely connected to the value of the benefit
obtained, especially when the settlement consists of intangible relief.65 In
fact, when a settlement or judgment generates a common fund, the attorneys'
fees are generally a percent of that fund, usually varying between twenty and
thirty percent.' When the suit results in a settlement consisting of intangible
"See Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 58 (Del. 1964).
6'he two methods used to calculate attorneys' fees in derivative litigation are the percent
method, applicable when the case generates a common fund, and the lodestar method, which may
be used whether or not a common fund is generated. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp.
1437,1449 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Under the lodestar method, attorneys' fees are calculated on the basis
of the number of hours reasonably expended by the attorney multiplied by the applicable market
hourly rate. See generally ALAN HrRSCH & DiANE SHEEHEY, AWARDING ATrORNEYs' FEES AND
MANAGINGFEELrnGATON 19 (Federal Judicial Center 1994) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424,433 (1983)). The court may then adjust the lodestar upward or downward, depending on a
number of factors, such as incomplete success, novelty or complexity of issues, exceptional success
or quality of representation, risk, etc. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-36. See generally HmscH &
SHEEHEY, supra, at 17-40 (discussing the factors relied upon by the courts in calculating the
appropriate award of attorneys' fees). By contrast, the percent method simply awards plaintiff
attorney a percent of the fimd generated by the litigation. Where there is a common fund, the federal
courts prefer to use the percent method. Id at 63-66. In the absence of a common fund, the courts
must resort to the lodestar method. Id. at 63-69. See also Southerland v. International
Longshoremen's Union, 845 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the appropriate starting
point in computing attorneys' fees is to multiply the number of hours reasonably spent by a
reasonable hourly rate); Levenson v. Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 354, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (determining that the baseline or "lodestar" figure for awarding attorneys' fees is
calculated by multiplying the number of hours counsel worked by a reasonable hourly rate).
The Delaware courts have stated that they will award fees as a "matter of discretion," and
that "the results achieved through the litigation are generally the primary consideration." Cohan v.
Loucks, No. 12,323, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 99, at * 10 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1993), reprinted in 19
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 697,703(1994). "Other factors include the time and effort expended by counsel,
the complexity of the litigation, the standing and ability of counsel and the contingent nature of the
fee arrangement." Id See also Good v. Texaco, Inc., No. 7501, 1985 WL 11536, at * 17 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 19, 1985), reprinted in 10 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 854, 880 (1995) (considering "the magnitude of
the case, the obstacles facing the plaintiffs at the outset... the expertise of counsel, the contingent
nature ofthe fee prospects facing [plaintiffs counsel] at the outset, [and] the effort put forth and the
resultachieved"); SugarlandIndus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142,149-50 (Del. 1980) (considering,
the amount of time and effort expended by counsel, the complex nature of the litigation, and the
expertise of counsel). In practice, however, in the absence of a fund, the Delaware courts rely
heavily on what amounts to the lodestar method. See infra note 66.
"In re Oracle See. Litig., 852 F. Supp. at 1452 (awarding derivative counsel 30% of
common fund); Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 18, at *17-18 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 6, 1997), reprinted in 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1300, 1311 (1997) (concluding that unusual
circumstances justified award of one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees); Thomas v.
Kempner, 398 A.2d 320,331 (Del. Ch 1979) (determining thatplaintiffs' counsel should be awarded
20% of common fund as attorneys' fees). Delaware courts have often demonstrated a willingness
to exercise independent judgment in common fund cases if the attorneys' fee, based on a percent
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relief, however, attorneys' fees are based primarily on the hours expended by
counsel. 7 If, in such instances, the fee were based instead on the value of
the benefit obtained, the incentive to prolong litigation would be reduced.
Thus, the courts should use, as a paradigm, a fee calculation stratagem
appropriate to the value of the benefit as if it were of paramount importance.
This approach has considerable appeal in cases such as Bolger,
because the corporation had in its articles of incorporation a provision
limiting the liability of directors for breach of fiduciary duty." Thus, from
the outset of the case, the only probable relief that the plaintiff could obtain
was corporate governance reform. It therefore seems wasteful to compensate.
the plaintiff for time spent seeking relief that was unobtainable, while
obtaining relief of questionable value. Moreover, providing generous
attorneys' fees in such a case runs contrary to the policy reflected in the
statutory provision that permits corporations to limit their director liability.69
The legislature intended these provisions to deter litigation such as that in
Bolger, while the actual decision in the case tends to encourage suits against
directors.
Another objection to the concept of limiting fees is that defendants
need not agree to the settlement; they can always opt to litigate the case to
final judgment. Here again, the unique aspects of derivative litigation must
be considered. In cases such as Bolger, the corporation has an obligation to
indemnify the director-defendants, unless they are adjudged liable; and even
if liable, the corporation may still be vulnerable for payment of their
of the fund, would be unreasonable (either too high or too low). In those instances, the courts look
to such factors as the number ofhours spent on the matter, its complexity, the risk involved, and the
expertise of the attorneys in determining the fee. See, e.g., Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corp., No.
8192-85, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 356, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 1986) (reducing the fee request of
17.5% of settlement to approximately 9%); Goldstone v. Texas Int'l Co., Nos. 6651, 6652, 6655
(Consolidated), & 7607, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 493, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 10, 1985), reprinted in
11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 658, 663 (1986) (holding that fees limited to 1% of $30 million benefit were
reasonable). See generally ROBERTCHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 661-62 (1986) (noting that
fees "cluster" around 20% of the common fund); Douglas G. Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders'
Derivative and Class Actions - Hornstein Revisited, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 259, 283-85 (1970);
Robert T. Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L.
267, 297-334 (1977).
'Eg, In re American Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. 13,687, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171,
at *21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 1997), reprinted in 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1243, 1253 (1998) (rejecting a fee
request of $500,000 based on purported value achieved in litigation, in favor of fee based in part on
hours expended); In re Dunkin' Donuts Shareholders Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,725, at 98,414-98,415 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1990), reprinted in 16 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1443, 1457 (1991) ('hen an unquantifiable benefit is involved, the quantum meruit approach
gives the Court a more equitable means of determining a reasonable fee.").
"Bell Atlantic v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1306 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993).
69DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1996).
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attorneys' fees.7° Notwithstanding that considerable expense, the corporation
has its own costs and expenses to consider, including the cost to its
operations of continuing the litigation. When weighing these amounts
against the benefits of disposing of the litigation at relatively little cost, the
choice is obvious in most instances. In a footnote to the Bolger opinion, the
court quoted from a statement made by defense counsel at the settlement
hearing explaining their rationale for agreeing to the settlement:
We settled because the relief proposed made sense. It fairly
met the issue that had created the problem with Bell of
Pennsylvania, and [also] because an award of counsel fees
ranging anywhere from zero to four hundred and fifty thousand
dollars was not far outside the range of what we thought it
would take to try this case to a jury .... 71
The court's assessment of the settlement was characterized as follows:
Even if plaintiffs hoped to secure a large damage award, this
would have to be drastically discounted by the improbability of
their success on the merits given the individual defendants'
strong defenses. Thus, even if we attach a small figure to the
value of the corporate governance changes..., this small value
may be fair consideration for and accurately reflect the
expected payout at trial net of the costs of trial.'
While the court is correct that the small likelihood of success at trial justifies
a minimal recovery, that same minimal recovery should operate to limit the
plaintiffs attorneys' fees because, almost by definition, the benefit is not
substantial. The principal benefit to the corporation was simply the
'Under the Delaware Code, for instance, the court of chancery has the authority to order
indemnification for the expenses of a director "adjudged... liable to the corporation" in a derivative
action if the court determines that "despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all of the
circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such
expenses which the Court of Chanery ... shall deem proper." Id. Other states are even more
permissive. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.0851, 180.0852 (West 1992) (requiring
indemnification unless the breach of duty was one in which the director (1) willfilly failed to deal
fairly with the corporation in a conffict of interest situation, (2) committed a crime, (3) received an
improper personal benefit, and (4) engaged in wilful misconduct).71BellAtlantic, 2 F.3d at 1313 n.14.
7Id. at 1313.
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dismissal of the litigation. Something must be amiss when dismissing a suit
is the basis for awarding fees to the plaintiff.'
A final objection might be that parsimonious awards of attorneys' fees
would overly deter what might otherwise be meritorious suits, and that other
procedures serve as a sorting mechanism for frivolous cases. These other
procedures include the contemporaneous ownership requirement,74 security-
for-expense statutes,75 high pleading standards,76 the demand requirement,77
the use of summary proceedings7 Rule 11 sanctions,7 9 etc. If the plaintiff
clears all of these hurdles, and settles the case, it arguably deserves a
generous fee award. However, the reality is that plaintiffs often settle cases
- particularly the weakest ones - before facing many of these hurdles. In
Caremark, for instance, a motion to dismiss was pending at the time of
settlement.80
In Bolger, the plaintiff barely survived defendants' motion for
summary judgment, which, in turn, was based on the decision of the Bell
Atlantic board to dismiss the litigation as not being in the corporation's best
interest."1 The district court agreed that the board had acted in good faith
when it sought dismissal, but the court was unconvinced that the board had
acted in an informed manner and with due care.' While this is a success of
sorts, the district court also held that the Bell Atlantic charter provision
absolved the defendants of monetary liability."3 Thus, the Court told the
plaintiff that it could go to trial, but it could obtain no monetary relief from
the defendants. At this point, the plaintiff had a strong incentive to settle for
anything that would support an award of attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the
defendants seized the opportunity to dispose of a distracting action, with
attendant public relations problems, at a relatively small price." Had the
rule been that the settlement, including a fee award, will not be approved
'See John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARV. L. REV. 849, 870 (1975) ('There must be something wrong with a method of analysis that
leads to the conclusion: though the start of suit had no effect other than providing an opportunity
to stop it, stopping it is enough to warrant awarding a fee.") See, e.g., United Operating Co. v.
Karnes, 482 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
74CLARK, supra note 66, at 650.
75Id. at 652.
76FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
'See CLARK, supra note 66, at 640-49.
"FED. M Crv. P. 56.
7FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
'In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 964-65 (Del. Ch. 1996).
"Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1306 (3d Cir. 1993).
8Id.
1id.
"See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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unless the fees are measured in relation to the benefit obtained, the case may
never have been brought, as it clearly should not have been.
Tying the award of attorneys' fees to the value of the benefit obtained
comports well with traditional notions of restitution, which are, after all, a
basis on which the fees are awarded." The Restatement of Restitution, for
instance, states this general rule: "Where a person is entitled to restitution
from another because the other.., has received a benefit, the measure of
recovery for the benefit thus received is the value of what was received
.... ,86 Courts departed from this notion in cases in which successful
lawyers sought fees from a common fund produced by their efforts. The
courts apparently felt comfortable awarding fees from such a fund on the
theory that, otherwise, the nonparty beneficiaries of the fund would be
unjustly enriched.87 It has seldom been noted that, in this regard, lawyers
receive special treatment by the courts; other such "intermeddlers" generally
remain uncompensated altogether, much less entitled to generous
compensation.8 The transition from the common fund doctrine to the
'Thstees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527,532-33 (1881) (concluding that plaintiff-bondholder
was entitled to attorneys' fee in successful action that benefited fellow bondholders to avoid
injustice). The late Professor John Dawson stated it well:
In the case supposed [where litigation results in a benefit to nonparty strangers] a
claim to recover unjust enrichment could be framed as a claim of the enterprising
litigantto enforce contribution to costs thathe had necessarily incurred in bringing
gains to himself and necessarily, without any element of altruism, to others.
Dawson, supra note 3, at 1601.
"RESTATEMENT REsTITUrIoN § 155 (1937). This section of the Restatement deals
generally with measuring the amount that the recipient of a service has to pay the provider, assuming
there is no contract between the parties and assuming that the other criteria justifying restitution are
present. Id Commentd makes clear that the costto the service provider is not the measure: "mhe
limit of restitution is the amount by which the recipient or his property has benefited, although the
value of the services or the amount which was expended therefore may be greater." Ia Assuming
that the "value" of a lawyer's service is the product of his hourly rate times the number of hours
expended, the Restatement makes clear that, were it to apply to attorneys' fees, the product thus
obtained would not measure the defendant's liability.
81in CentralR.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 122 (1885), the Supreme Court
extended an earlierprecedent, Trusteesv. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), thatrecognizedthe right
of a party to seek contribution from a common fund for the legal expenses of that party in generating
the fund. CentralR.R., 113 U.S. at 123. InPettus the Court held that the lawyer had a right against
the fund. Id. at 127. Commenting on these two cases, the late Professor Dawson wrote: "The case
law that has grown out of Greenough and Pettus expresses a conviction, widely held amongjudges
and lawyers, at least, that lawyers have a right that is denied to all the rest of the population, to share
the wealth of strangers their services have produced." Dawson, supra note 3, at 1608.
'Dawson, supra note 3, at 1608. In the conclusion of his article Professor Dawson sought
to explain this anomaly:
I]he reception given the Pettus case can only be explained by the strong fellow-
feeling ofjudges for brothers in the guild. Similar bounty sought by other kinds
of professionals or indeed by anyone else in the population is uniformly denied,
so abruptly as a rule that the claim seems to be thought not worthy of discussion.
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substantial benefit rule, which allows attorneys' fees in the absence of a
common fund provided the corporation receives a substantial benefit from
the efforts of the plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel, seems logical enough. 9 On
closer examination, however, the transition is troublesome.
In a typical derivative action seeking and obtaining monetary recovery
that flows to the corporation, each shareholder has been indirectly benefited
by the successful action; presumably, the value of the shareholder's shares
is increased, pro rata, by the recovery. Thus, any reduction attributable to
the payment of the attorneys' fee would still leave the shareholder better off
than before the action. This is true regardless of the formula used to
compensate the successful attorney so long as the fee is less than the
recovery.
Where there is no common fund, however, the mathematics are
different. In that case, the "substantial benefit" to the shareholders would
seem to justify an award of attorneys' fees only if the benefit somehow
enhanced the value of the corporate stock. If, for instance, the market for a
publicly traded company took notice of a derivative action settlement that
imposed some corporate governance reform, and, as a result, bid up the price
of the stock of the corporation, then by analogy to the common fund
doctrine, the stockholders should disgorge a portion of this gain to the
lawyers who secured it for them. But if there is no bump in the stock price,
that is, if the intangible benefit of the settlement is not viewed by the market
as enhancing the value of the corporation, or the benefit cannot otherwise be
quantified, then there seems little reason to award fees to the attorney who
secured this nebulous victory.9'
Moreover, it seems almost perverse to award attorneys' fees from the
corporate coffers in such instances, because such an award diminishes the
Id. at 1653.
"gSee Hammett, supra note 54, and accompanying text.
9°This assumes that the costs of the litigation to the corporation, both direct and indirect,
are less than the net benefit to it (after plaintiffs attorneys' fees).
9 For an example of a case in which the court attempted to quantify an intangible benefit,
see Baupost Limited Partnership 1983 A-1 v. Providential Corp., No. 12,978, 1993 WL 401866,
at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3,1993) (settlement resulted in the elimination of certain stock options, which
the court valued at over $2.5 million, approving a fee of $326,000 or 13% of the benefit obtained).
A review of cases decided earlier this century suggests that the courts routinely quantified the relief
obtained, See Hornstein, Counsel Fee, supra note 2, at 812-15. A follow-up study done by the
author about eight years later confirmed this practice. George D. Hornstein, New Aspects of
Stockholders Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24 (1947) ("In rewarding successful
complainants, the court must first determine the value of the benefits derived by the corporation
from the judgment or settlement of the suit.") The rule in Delaware appears to be that "the benefit
need not be measurable in economic terms." Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162,
1165 (Del. 1989).
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pro rata value of each shareholder's interest in the corporation.' Courts do
not consider this circumstance when approving fee settlements in derivative
actions where no common fund results. Interestingly, I have been unable to
find any cases approving fees, solely on the basis of a common fund, where
the fee award exceeded the amount of the common fund.' Yet the courts
willingly approve such fees in the absence of any common fund, despite the
fact that those fee awards may have the same economic effect on the
shareholders as an award of fees that exceeds the common fund.94
It is not insignificant in this regard that within substantial benefit
cases the fee payer is invariably the corporation itself. This seems
unobjectionable since the balance of the fund (net of the attorneys' fee
award), in the common fund cases, becomes part of the corporate treasury.
Moreover, in theory, when the common fund represents amounts paid by
defendants, it could include amounts to cover all or a portion of the
plaintiffs attorneys' fee, so that, in effect, the shareholders do not pay the fee
themselves. This possibility, however, evaporates when no fund is created,
no enhancement of shareholder wealth is realized, and the corporation itself
pays the fees. In such instances, if the courts are to continue to award fees
to the plaintiff, they should require that the fees be paid by the defendants,
without reimbursement by the corporation.95 If this is impossible, because
'See Fletcher v. AJ. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rplr. 146, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (Christian,
J., dissenting in part).
[I]f the existence of a "common fund" ... is not prerequisite to the allowance of
fees the officers and directors might well be faced with a liquidation of assets to
pay fees, even though [the] resulting harm to the corporation might be
disproportionate to the "substantial benefits" derived from the lawsuit.
Id. See also Fischer & Porter Co. v. Tolson, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 87, 92-93 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(refusing to approve the settlement including plaintiffs attorneys' fees because the corporate
governance changes were "only marginally valuable" to the corporation and "the proposed settlement
accomplishe[d] little more than to handsomely reward plaintiffs attorneys").
'See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 18, at * 17-18 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 6, 1997), reprinted in 22 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1300, 1311 (1997) (rejecting fee request of
$1,529,867 because common fund was only $430,092 and plaintiffs attorney would be awarded
one-third ofthat fund); Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y. Supp. 351,354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909) (holding
that where defendant "prevail[s] as to the major portion of the claims asserted against him," costs
will not be assessed). Of course, where the suit results in both monetary and direct nonmonetary
relief, such as cancellation of claims against the corporation, the fee award may exceed the cash
recovery. See, e.g., Colley v. Sapp, 142 P. 1193, 1193-95 (Okl. 1914).
'See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
"This appears to have been the case in Goody. Texaco, Inc., No. 7501, 1985 WL 11536,
at * 17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985), reprinted in 10 DEL. L Coiu. L. 854, 878-80 (1985), in which the
Delaware Court of Chancery approved the settlement in a combined class and derivative action
where no money changed hands other than the payment of plaintiffs attorneys' fees. Technically,
however, this may be objectionable, since it amounts to fee shifting to the defendants. See cases
cited infra note 96 for examples.
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of prohibitions on fee shifting," or because the corporation is required to
indemnify the defendants,' or because the corporate charter immunizes the
defendants from personal liability," then it seems that an award of attorneys'
fees should be precluded, unless the "substantial benefit" can somehow be
quantified.99
This approach is consistent with the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)W and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,01
each of which limits attorneys' fees. Under the PSLRA, the court may award
fees in securities class actions equal to a "reasonable percentage of the
amount of any damages [and] prejudgment interest actually paid."" This
provision suggests that if the settlement of a class action under the PSLRA
results solely in nonpecuniary relief, attorneys' fees may not be awarded. 3
Thus, unlike fees in derivative actions, fees under the PSLRA are calculated
solely with reference to the result obtained. Similarly, under the Bankruptcy
Act, an attorney retained by the bankruptcy trustee is entitled only to
"See, e.g., Jones v. Uris Sales Corp., 373 F.2d 644, 648 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that itwas
error to direct that the individual defendant, rather than the defendant corporation, pay fees of
plaintiffs attorney); Fistal v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that
dismissal conditioned solely on payment of fees to plaintiffs attorney by the "insider," with the
corporation receiving nothing, would be contrary to the purpose of the statute).
"7See, e.g., Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87,97 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
employee entitled to reimbursement for legal expenses under section of Delaware statute allowing
for indemnification for success on the merits in defense of suit involving corporation); Raychem
Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170,1179 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that indemnification
ofofficers and directors for settlementpayments and defense costs in securities fraud action metthe
criteria under their insurance clause for reimbursement where "permitted or required" by law).
"See, e.g., Von Feldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 85 (Del. 1998) (granting director
legal costs and expenses pursuant to parent company's bylaws); Heffeman v. Pacific Dunlop GNB
Corp., 965 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1992) (remanding for determination of whether plaintiff met
corporate bylawprerequisites for indemnification). Butsee Mayerv. Executive Telecard, Ltd., 705
A.2d 220, 223 (Del. Ch. 1997) (holding that attorneys' fees were not recoverable in plaintiffs
successful action to enforce corporation's obligation to indemnify officers and directors under the
corporate bylaws, entitling this a "fees for fees" action).
"See, e.g., Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957). Here, the plaintiff
brought a derivative action alleging thatthe director-defendants were in violation ofthe Clayton Act
because they held interlocking directorships. When the defendants resigned from the other
directorship, the suit was dismissed and the plaintiff sought attorneys' fees. The court denied the
petition because the "success" was an insufficientbenefitto the corporation tojustify the fee request.
Id. at 540. But see Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1995) (advancing
plaintiffs' costs of pending litigation because defendants' bylaws required indemnification of
employees sued by reason of their employment).
1-15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-la(6), 78u-4a(6) (West 1997).
10115 U.S.C.A. § 330(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
1-15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-la(6), 78u-4a(6) (West 1997).
'"See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud ClassActions Virtuous, 39 ARiz. L. REV.
497, 518 (1997).
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"reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services." 1 4 The attorney's
fiduciary duty to the estate requires him to make a careful judgment at the
outset of the case, "whether the number of billable hours that he [will] be
investing [is] commensurate with the expected gain."10 5 If the attorney
miscalculates, the recoverable fee is directly affected."c
A final objection to the current practice of awarding fees for the
achievement of corporate governance reform is that such reforms are
achievable in a more efficient way. Shareholders dissatisfied with some
aspect of the governance structure can alter that structure through bylaw or
charter amendments utilizing Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,"° or by replacing the board of directors. While this latter remedy is
generally expensive, if feasible at all, the former is both inexpensive and
available. Rule 14a-8 provides an easy means to affect corporate
governance, as long as the shareholders generally favor such reform.' 8
V. THE LIBERALIZATION OF RULE 14a-8
The federal proxy rules have long provided a means by which
shareholders can include in their company's proxy statement a proposal for
action by the shareholders. This mechanism frequently has been used by
shareholders to suggest reforms in corporate governance.1" For instance, it
is not uncommon for shareholders to propose that the bylaws of the
corporation be amended to eliminate a requirement for a staggered or
classified board.1  With the increasing activism of institutional
shareholders, such proposals have garnered significant support in many
instances, with an occasional success.11'
Under current rules, shareholders desiring to include a proposal in the
corporations proxy statement must first submit the proposal to the
corporation. 12 The corporation must include the proposal in its proxy
statement for shareholder approval, unless the corporation has certain
1 411 U.S.C.A. § 330(a)(1)(A).
"'In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310,314 (7th Cir. 1995).
'
4Id. at 316.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1998).
"See generally 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8 (1998) (specifying mechanics for proposing changes
in corporate governance).
"See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993); Granada Invs. Inc.
v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1992); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 54 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
"'See, e.g., Corporate Governance Bulletin (Investor Responsibility Research Center,
May/June 1993).
"'Ia.
11217 C.F.RL § 240.14a-8.
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grounds under the rule for omitting the proposal."' Two grounds are
particularly pertinent to proposals related to corporate governance: one that
permits the corporation to exclude a shareholder proposal that relates to
"ordinary business operations,""' and another that permits exclusion of
proposals that are "not a proper subject for action" ' under the law of the
corporation's state of incorporation. Using either rationale, companies have
sought to omit various proposals related to corporate governance.11 6 If a
corporation determines to omit a proposal, the Commission's rules require
the company to so inform it, and the Commission will then advise the
company as to whether or not it agrees with such a determination. 7 If either
the company or the shareholder-proposer is dissatisfied with the
Commission's decision, the aggrieved party may bring the matter to the
federal courts for adjudication. In any event, the possibility of company
rejection, SEC review and judicial action add cost and uncertainty to the
process, thereby deterring some shareholders from making proposals in the
first instance, or from pursuing the steps required for ultimate inclusion. So
while Rule 14a-8 provides a means by which shareholders can implement a
change in corporate governance, it is less than perfect.1
The viability of Rule 14a-8 as a means to corporate governance
reform is also enhanced by the availability of attorneys' fees for parties who
are successful in getting a proposal into the corporation's proxy statement.
In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., "9 the Second Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys' fees in the amount
of $54,140 for shareholders who succeeded in obtaining a judgment that
raIn addition, the shareholdermust satisfy certainprocedural requirements, such as owning
at least one percent or $1,000 in market value of the registranfs stock, submitting the proposal not
less than 120 days before the date of the release of the previous year's proxy statement, etc. See 17
C.F.L § 240.14a-8(a).
"'17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7).
"s17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1).
"(See generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social
Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50
RuTGERS L REv. 33 (1997) (criticizing the rules permitting corporations to exclude proposals).
1"17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d). See also Lazaroff, supra note 116, at 44 (discussing the
requirements for omitting a proposal).
"'In October 1997, the SEC proposed amendments to these rules that, in one respect, would
have made the shareholder proposal rules more attractive for those seeking changes in corporate
governance.
The SECs proposal included a provision that would have permitted shareholders owning
a certain percentage of the corporation's outstanding stock to override the determination that a
proposal is excludable because it relates to the corporation's ordinary business or because the
proposal is insignificant in relation to the company's business. Exchange Act Rel. No. 39093, 62
Fed. Reg. 50682 (Sept. 26, 1997). In its final rules, however, the SEC declined to adopt this
amendment. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
11954 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
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their proposal - related to Wal-Mart's affirmative action policies - was
improperly excluded by Wal-Mart from its proxy statement. 2 ' Significantly,
the court found that the fees were justified despite the fact that Wal-Mart had
received a no-action letter from the SEC supporting the omission of the
proposal, and over ninety percent of Wal-Martfs shareholders subsequently
voted against the proposal."' Rather, the court held that promoting
"corporate suffrage regarding a significant policy issue confers a substantial
benefit regardless of the percentage of votes cast for or against the proposal
at issue."'" Similarly, while current precedent suggests otherwise, attorneys'
fees could be awarded in cases in which the proposal was included without
the benefit of litigation, and the amount of the fee can reflect a premium
because litigation was avoided."
By contrast, suppose the shareholder-proposers in Wal-Mart had,
instead of proceeding under Rule 14a-8, filed a derivative action claiming
that the Wal-Mart directors violated their fiduciary duty of care by failing to
implement measures to assure compliance with federal civil rights statutes.
Even assuming that such a claim might lack merit, it is not inconceivable
that the corporation would settle this action by agreeing to include in its
201d. at 72.
121id.
'Id.
raInFoleyv. Santa Fe Pacific Corp., 641 N.E.2d 992,996 (111. App. 1994), the courtheld
that "[a]bsent the filing of an underlying meritorious lawsuit, there can be no suit for the recovery
of fees under the 'corporate benefit' rule." The suit was filed following plaintiffs successful proxy
fight to achieve the removal of a poison pill. Plaintiff sought reimbursement for his fees and costs
in connection with the contest on the theory that his efforts created a substantial benefit for the
shareholders. Id at 993. The court refused to extend the substantial benefit rule to a nonlitigation
context Id. at 996. This was an unfortunate result, at least for those instances in which plaintiff
forewent a litigation option. See also Wyser-Pratte v. Van Dora Co., B.T.Z., Inc., 49 F.3d 213, 218-
19 (6th Cir. 1995) (denying attorneys' fees to shareholder who was successful in proxy solicitation
where litigation was not required).
By comparison, in Neese v. Richer, 428 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. App. 1981), the plaintiff was
unsuccessful in a derivative action alleging fraud and mismanagement Id at 37. In dismissing the
derivative action, however, the trial court noted that the corporation had not maintained proper books
and records, as required by the Indiana corporate statute, and ordered an audit of the corporate
books. Id. Plaintiff then requested fees based on this audit, arguing that it benefited the
shareholders. Id at 38. The court agreed and awarded fees to the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff
probably could not have brought a derivative action to require the corporation to comply with the
statute. Id at 42-43. Arguably, if the court was willing to award fees for an incidental benefit
generated by an unsuccessful derivative action, it should be willing to award fees for the same
benefit obtained directly without the benefit of litigation.
The Delaware courts have indicated a willingness to award attorneys' fees ifa pre-litigation
demand caused the board to act in a way that benefited the shareholders, provided that the
underlying claim was otherwise meritorious. Bird v. Lida, 681 A.2d 399, 407 (Del. Ch. 1996). See
also Lansky v. NWA, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Minn. CL App. 1991) (determining that
attorneys' fees may be awarded if board action moots a derivative action, if there is a substantial
benefit to the shareholders caused by the filing of the suit).
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proxy statement a proposal to implement a more aggressive affirmative
action proposal, such as that which was the subject of the actual Wal-Mart
litigation. Under these circumstances, is it appropriate to award attorneys'
fees to plaintiffs on the basis of the time spent to achieve this result, even if
such fees are vastly more than what it would have cost to obtain the same
result under Rule 14a-8? Stated differently, if a relatively inexpensive
mechanism is in place to obtain the relief that plaintiff obtained, why not
limit the fee award to the less expensive means? Weisberg v. Coastal States
Gas Corp.'24 provides a paradigm fact situation for application of this
approach.
In Weisberg, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-directors were
responsible for illegal payments made by the corporation."n After literally
thousands of billable hours, plaintiffs "concluded that they lack evidence to
support an allegation of a kickback" and, therefore, settled the case for
"revised corporate policies requiring disclosure to shareholders concerning
commission payments."'" Under atraditional unjust enrichment evaluation,
this would appear to be of minimal value. Yet the court could not ignore the
hours expended by the two lawyers representing the plaintiffs: 1,428.75
hours by one counsel and 1,043 by the other, before adjustment for what the
court characterized as "unproductive" time. 7 After adjustments, the court
awarded the two lawyers a total of approximately $220,000.8 The court
was clearly more concerned with the number of hours spent than with the
value of the benefit generated for the corporation. Had the court considered
the latter as the paramount concern, the award may have been close to zero.
Some award may have been justified by reference to Rule 14a-8. Inasmuch
as plaintiff could have accomplished the same objective through that
mechanism, the award of attorneys' fees should be limited to the fees that
might have been obtained there.
VI. WOULD A LIMITATION ON ATrORNEYS' FEES
OVERLY DETER MERITORIOUS LITIGATION
OR INHIBIT SETTLEMENTS?
Arguments against a further limitation on attorneys' fees in derivative
actions may be that such limitations might deter meritorious litigation. This
is, of course, an empirical problem. A few observations, however, seem
"[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,716 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1'Id.
"'Id.
17Id.
'Veisbergv. Coastal States Gas Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,716 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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appropriate. First, limiting fees on the basis of the value of the result
achieved would alter current rules in relatively narrow circumstances; that
is, when plaintiff alleges a breach of fiduciary duty and settles for corporate
governance reform or some similar intangible relief. This will generally be
the case when the plaintiffs claim is weak and/or the defendants have the
protection of a charter provision that limits their liability for monetary
damages. In each such instance, the deterrence seems appropriate.
Second, attorneys' fees would still be available, but would be limited
to the value of the benefit obtained, as measured by the least expensive
means of obtaining that benefit. This comports with traditional notions of
restitution that are well grounded in equitable principles. Third, it is
apparent from cases like Caremark, Bolger, Weisberg, and Seinfeld"29 that
marginal, if not frivolous, cases garner settlements of dubious value to the
plaintiff shareholders and impose considerable cost and expense upon the
corporation. This proposal is narrowly tailored to deal with such cases.
Perhaps the burden should fall on those who would object to it to
demonstrate the merit of such cases and of those that would, in fact, be
deterred by the proposal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Attorneys' fees recoverable in the settlement of a derivative action
presents somewhat of an anomaly in the law. The plaintiffs attorney brings
the action as an intermeddler of sorts, and under general common law
principles, would not be entitled to a reward for his actions. Even accepting
the rationale for approving fees in some derivative actions, it is difficult to
accept the fees awarded in many cases. In parallel situations, under the
bankruptcy laws and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, both the
availability and amount of attorneys' fees are limited in comparison to the
situation in derivative actions. The reasons for this anomaly seem to be
historically and prudentially based, but nevertheless ripe for reconsideration.
I have argued here that, in approving a settlement that includes attorneys'
fees, courts should take seriously their own occasional pronouncements that
the settlement must substantially benefit the corporation, and the fee must
relate to the value of that benefit. In so acting, shareholders will bring fewer
cases of questionable merit, and their attorneys will recover only fair
compensation in the cases that are brought.
"'See supra notes 8, 51, & 124 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24
